Conflict prevention requires institutions people can question, influence and trust. Research and examples from African countries show why accountability, inclusive dialogue and the enforcement of public rules deserve a place in peacebuilding work.
What happens when someone challenges a public decision? Can they seek an explanation, report abuse or raise a grievance without putting themselves at risk? These questions bring governance closer to everyday experience. They also give peacebuilding organisations something concrete to examine before a dispute becomes a crisis.
The V-Dem Institute’s Democracy Report 2026 findings show the pressure on democratic institutions. Nearly a quarter of the world’s countries were undergoing autocratization, or democratic backsliding, in 2025. Six of the ten newly identified autocratizing countries were in Europe and North America. The figures describe changes in democracy; they are not a forecast of armed conflict.
For emerging democracies, elections remain important. Between elections, however, people also need credible ways to influence decisions and hold power accountable. Four lessons help explain what that requires in practice.
Lesson one: State capacity needs accountability
A government’s ability to exercise authority does not, by itself, tell us whether its institutions are fair or trusted. A 2025 PRIO study on development assistance and conflict prevention, by Siri Aas Rustad, Júlia Palik, Øystein H. Rolandsen and Kathrine Rudolfsen, examines this distinction through a systematic literature review and case studies of South Sudan and Mozambique.
The report contrasts institutional fragmentation in South Sudan with a capable but exclusionary state in Mozambique. In its Mozambique analysis, the concentration and monopolisation of power contribute to fragility even where the state can project authority. This is a contextual finding, not a claim that stronger public institutions necessarily increase violence.
The researchers identify accountable governance, livelihoods and locally legitimate actors as important to effective assistance, alongside safeguards against elite capture. Their analysis supports community-driven and nationally owned approaches rather than externally imposed models.
For donors and implementers, the practical question is whose authority a programme strengthens. Community engagement should allow people to influence the work, including those outside established leadership networks. Selection criteria, access to resources and complaint procedures need scrutiny before an intervention is described as inclusive.
CIDPAGCA’s article on building peace through economic development explores the related problem: a livelihood project can create opportunities while still deepening grievances if people consider its decisions unfair.
Lesson two: Accountability for past abuses can support prevention
In Accountability Shock: Why Transitional Justice Prevents Criminal Wars in New Democracies, published in 2026, Guillermo Trejo, Lucía Tiscornia and Juan Albarracín examine six Latin American cases. Their argument connects transitional justice with the risk of organised criminal violence after authoritarian rule.
The authors identify a mechanism through which truth commissions and prosecutions can disrupt impunity. People involved in authoritarian violence may retain coercive networks and institutional protection after a political transition. Accountability can restrict their ability to move into criminal activity or sustain relationships between state actors and criminal groups.
This research concerns particular forms of violence and a specific regional evidence base. It should inform African policy discussions without being treated as a universal guarantee that one justice mechanism will prevent conflict everywhere.
The practical lesson is to examine what happens to abusive networks during a transition, alongside the change in political leadership. Justice measures require attention to institutional independence, due process and the safety of witnesses and affected communities. Reconciliation cannot be assessed solely by the presence of a commission or the completion of a public ceremony.
Lesson three: Anti-corruption rules must work in practice
Liberia offers a useful institutional example. In the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission’s account of an April 2025 World Bank forum, Chairperson Alexandra Kormah Zoe linked corruption with the country’s civil conflict: “It was a trigger that helped accelerate years of senseless war in our country.”
The account describes post-war reforms, including international oversight of public financial management through the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program. It also traces the Commission’s development from its establishment in 2008 to a mandate that includes direct investigation and prosecution. These are institutional developments reported by the Commission, rather than an independent estimate of their effect on conflict.
Implementation remains a separate test. The Commission’s third quarterly report for 2024 reported 48% participation by public officials in that year’s asset-declaration exercise, according to its records. This historical figure should not be read as Liberia’s current compliance rate.
The report also discussed verification and sanctions for non-compliance. Declaring an asset, checking whether a declaration is truthful and responding to a breach are different stages of accountability. A law can establish an obligation without ensuring that each stage works.
For peacebuilding partners, this means asking how an institution handles a real concern. Is information accessible? Can people report misconduct safely? Are cases investigated consistently? What happens when an official does not comply? These questions help move governance work beyond the existence of legislation.
Lesson four: Inclusive dialogue needs influence and follow-through
São Tomé and Príncipe illustrates how prevention can be organised around national institutions. The joint statement following its May 2025 Peacebuilding Commission meeting describes a Conflict Prevention Strategy for 2025–2029. It connects democratic governance with public confidence in justice and security institutions, following a joint UN–ECCAS assessment of those sectors.
The strategy also provides for an inclusive approach involving civil society, women and young people. Its adoption is a policy commitment, not proof of a reduction in violence. Implementation requires resources, clear responsibilities and a way to assess progress.
A different example comes from Guinea-Bissau. The UN’s Seeds of Stability account of the Youth Political Parties Forum describes a UNFPA-supported initiative under the Peacebuilding Fund. Its principle of zero exclusion sought to give youth, women and persons with disabilities a stronger voice within political structures. The account reports changes in participants’ attitudes and party practices.
Those reports illustrate a possible contribution to participation. They do not establish that the Forum independently prevented electoral violence or secured national democratic stability. The UN Secretary-General condemned the November 2025 coup in Guinea-Bissau. Community-level gains and a national constitutional breakdown can occur in the same country, and each needs to be reported honestly.
The lesson for programme design is to connect dialogue with decisions. Participants need access to information, a genuine opportunity to influence the agenda and an explanation of what happened to their proposals. CIDPAGCA’s article on women at the table and in the community examines why visibility alone is an inadequate measure of participation.
What this means for peacebuilding practice
The cases above offer different kinds of evidence: research findings, an institution’s own reporting, a national strategy and a programme account. Together, they provide questions for programme design. They do not prove that every accountability or dialogue intervention will prevent violence.
Before funding or launching governance work, partners should agree on the change they want to see and how to assess it:
- Identify the grievance and the responsible institution. Establish who is affected, what decision is disputed and which body can respond.
- Give participation a route into decisions. Record whose views shaped the work and explain how proposals were used or why they were declined.
- Check the response, not just the rule. Follow complaints, investigations and agreed actions through to their resolution.
- Protect people who speak. Make confidentiality, informed consent and the risk of retaliation part of the design.
- Report change within the limits of the evidence. Attendance shows reach. Changes in access, perceived fairness or institutional response require their own measures. A claim that violence was prevented demands stronger evidence still.
For CIDPAGCA, these questions connect research, dialogue and community action with its commitment to peace and good governance. They make it possible to discuss shortcomings as well as progress, without speaking over the people affected.
If you lead, fund or deliver governance and peacebuilding work, contact CIDPAGCA to discuss research or dialogue around a specific institutional challenge. Begin with the concern communities have raised, the response they need and what would count as a credible improvement.